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Abstract 
 
Property value is a function of property characteristics, accessibility characteristics, neighbourhood 
characteristics and environmental characteristics. Many of the variables determining property value had been 
well researched into while a few had only been scratched at the surface. Therefore, this study examined the 
causes of militant activities and their effects on property values in Port Harcourt. In achieving the objectives of 
the study, questionnaire was administered on the ninety-nine (99) firms of Estate Surveying and Valuation in Port 
Harcourt out of which sixty-eight (68) was retrieved. Both descriptive and deductive statistical tools were 
employed in analysing the data collected. Regression analysis, relative importance index (RII) and principal 
component analysis (PCA) tests were conducted to answer the question on the effects of militant activities on 
property values. An analysis of R2 between the neighbourhoods affected and the ones not affected by militant 
activities clearly revealed that militant activities affected property values in Port Harcourt. The study 
recommends joint efforts of both the government and oil companies at mitigating the various factors responsible 
for militant activities in Prot Harcourt so as to attract interest of residents to the city as this will result in high 
demand and attendant increased rental values. 
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Introduction 
 
The demand for real estate has continued to increase over the years and this has resulted to increase in value 
ascribed to it. The measure of a property’s value is a function of its degree of utility and scarcity relative to 
comparable utilities (Olusegun 2008). However, there are several other factors influencing property values 
positively or negatively. Widely accepted factors, which significantly influence property values include the 
various components of property characteristics, accessibility characteristics, neighbourhood characteristics and 
environmental characteristics. 
 
The activities of several armed militant groups have cast a huge shadow of doubt on the safety of life, commerce 
and properties. Although their activities are said to be directed towards fighting for a good cause, the means 
adopted had caused threats to the lives of residents in such areas. A case in point is the militant activities within 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, which had caused security threats to oil companies, expatriates and even the 
natives of the region. Their activities target oil production facilities, oil workers and law enforcement agents and 
has extended to affect the natives and their properties. Although the activities of all militant groups in the delta 
have been focused on fighting for a greater share of the country’s oil revenue utilized for the development of the 
region, they however have adopted anti-progressive means such as kidnapping, sabotage, theft, property 
destruction, and guerilla warfare. 
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In Nigeria today, many people have lost loved ones and properties as a result of the activities of militant groups, 
some are yet to find loved ones who have been kidnapped, some still grieve over loved ones that have been killed, 
people have also lost valuable properties due to bomb attacks attached to these activities. Most people who reside 
in areas where militant activities are prevalent have lost every sense of security and those in areas where such 
activities have subsided live in constant fear hoping they never resurface. Bannister and Fyfe (2001) noted that the 
fear of crime is closely related to densely populated and built environment. Although the reason behind various 
militant activities may vary from place to place or time to time, its adverse effects on the lives and properties will 
always be a cause of concern. It is for this reason that the study examined the causes of militant activities and 
their effects on property values. 
 
Concept of Militant Activities 
 
Various definitions had been given to the term militancy. The word “militancy” can be understood as the acts of 
individuals, groups or parties displaying or engaging in violence, usually for a cause, whether religious, political, 
ideological, economic, or social. Nowadays, the term militant is synonymously used with the term ‘terrorist.’ 
(Quamruzzaman, 2010). Militancy is a state or condition of being combative or disposed to fight for a cause or 
belief (Chindah and Braide, 2000). It has also been defined as a violent response by an individual, group or sect in 
a region, community, state or nation due to claims of underdevelopment, political oppression, religious beliefs and 
segregation. According to Ashimolowo and Odiachi (2012) the motive is that people want their rights and if they 
are not going to get it by negotiation, they simply will then have it by violence against the “powers that be”  
 
Hornby (2009) defined militia as an organized group of people comparable to a military force. Quamruzzaman 
(2010) was of the view that the contemporary sense of the term militia as “paramilitary force motivated by 
religious or political ideology, especially one that engages in rebel or terrorist activities in opposition to a regular 
army" is associated with the US usage in the early 1990s as applied to a number of rightwing groups opposed to 
gun control and distrustful of the federal government. 
 
In modern times, various movements seek to apply militancy as a solution, or use militancy to rationalize their 
solutions for issues. But these movements do not share common tactics. Usually, a militant uses violence as part 
of a claimed struggle against oppression. Quamruzzaman (2010) stated that a militia movement has five 
dimensions ideology, motivation, mobilization, organization and ritual. This word is sometimes used to describe 
anyone with strongly held views (e.g., militant christian, militant atheist). A militant person or group expresses a 
physically aggressive posture while in support of an ideology or a cause. A militant person is confrontational 
regardless of physical violence or pacifistic methods. 
 
Causes of Militant Activities 
 
Nkrumah (1978) stated that the nature and cause of the conflict between the ruling class and the exploited class is 
influenced by the development of productive forces, that is, changes in technology; the economic relations which 
these forces condition; and the ideologies that reflect the properties and the psychology of the people living in the 
society. 
 
According to Lamb and Hameed (2012) many militant groups in Pakistan have non-religious motivations for their 
use of violence. These include secessionists, political sectarians, organized criminal networks, warlords, and tribal 
militias, among others. The militant groups’ focus are those of concern to the U.S policy maker, which are mostly 
associated with religious ideologies. They are of the opinion that Islamists have pan-Islamic political objectives, 
while self-declared jihadi groups see themselves as defending Muslims in Afghanistan or Kashmir against non-
Muslims. These categories are not mutually exclusive; for example, some jihadists defend Muslims they consider 
“good” against those they consider heretics. Are militant activities in Nigeria caused by the same or similar 
factors identified above? This is question to be answered in the next section of this study. 
 
Causes of Militant Activities in Nigeria 
 
With various attacks on the Nigerian polity, militia has taken the front burner in the contemporary discourse. 
Onimajesin (2003) stated that the restoration of democratic rule in Nigeria on 29 May 1999 signaled the 
emergence and continued creation of vigilante groups, ethnic and sectional militias as well as secessionist or 
separatist groups. Okechuku (2003) identified prominent ones to include O’ odua People’s Congress (OPC), 
formed in 1994 as a militant arm of Afenifere, a pan- Yoruba group and National Democratic Coalition 
(NADECO) that were in the forefront of protesting the annulment of the June 12, 1993 general elections.  
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Arewa Peoples’ Congress (APC) was formed to serve as a check on OPC incessant attacks on the Hausa/Fulani 
population in Lagos and other Yoruba towns. Igbo Peoples’ Congress (IPC), a militant arm of Ohanaeze Eastern 
Mandate in response to, OPC and others that frequently vandalize their goods and properties across the country 
was formed in 1999. Others are the Bakassi Boys, a vigilante outfit set up by Abia and Anambra State 
governments to curb criminal activities in 1999, the Egbesu Boys 1998, Movement for the Actualization of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 2000, Tiv Militia 2001, Jukun Militia 2001, Ijaw Militia 1999, Itsekiri 
Militia 1999, and the Militia arm of Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP) 1992. Odogiyon 
(2009) opined that the unprecedented emergence of Militant groups is as a result of the dissatisfaction with the 
structure, operation and power structure under the Nigerian federation.  
 
In the Niger Delta, the grievances of the people against the government and the multinational oil companies 
provided the impetus for social mobilization often (but not always) along ethnic lines. The foregoing found 
expression in increase in minority political activity at the elite level, lobbies, the formation of coalitions, and local 
community agitation for more revenues derived from oil wealth at one end and for resource control at the other. 
The local peoples’ determination to pursue these issues arose from increasing denationalization of the state on a 
global scale, which has seen the rise of sub state identities being the fulcrum of group rights and citizenship 
claims. These groups in the quest for their collective, but particularistic interests adopt all techniques including 
the use of violence (Adejumobi, 2003). 
 
According to Duru (2010) violent agitations of varying magnitude dates back to the pre-colonial era as the politics 
of oil merchandise produced the first nationalists in the Niger Delta. These were African merchants and rulers 
who insisted that the trade must bring a fair deal to the area. He said that the agitation continued until the post-
colonial era in 1966 when there was a 12 day revolution by Isaac Adaka Boro a Niger Delta indigene who led a 
small guerrilla army of Ijaw nationals to declare the Niger Delta Republic however at the end federal troops 
overcame Boro and his compatriots, and they were tried for treason and condemned to death on June 21, 1966. He 
also identified the Ogoni uprising, which started and lasted between 1990 and 1995 as taking different dimension 
from Boro as it sought redress in ways which involved mobilized mass action and direct confrontation with the 
state. Also Ken Saro Wiwa led the insurrection against Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), along 
with eight others and they paid with their lives on November 10, 1995. 
 
Ekpo (2004) said that the experiences of Adaka Boro and Ken Saro Wiwa showed that the political atmosphere, 
for the greater part of the period during which the country was under military rule, did not present opportunities 
for a more forceful approach to demands for equity, justice and fair play in the Niger Delta. However, since the 
emergence of the fourth republic in 1999, agitations in the Niger Delta moved from demands for a fair share of 
the national cake to the right to have control over natural resources that are found in the area. The governors of the 
Niger Delta States and the entire Conference of the Southern Governors championed the demand for resource 
control. This was however laid to rest by the Supreme Court ruling in favour of the Federal Government on April 
5, 2002. 
 
Ejibunu (2007) identified the causes of growing insurgency in the Niger Delta as structural deficiency of the 
Nigerian federation, poverty and high scale deprivation of the means of livelihood, environmental damage due to 
oil spillage, gas flaring, oil pipeline explosions, lack of development and unemployment, human rights violations, 
bad governance/corruption such as the divide and rule tactics of oil companies, alleged insincerity of the federal 
government, killing of Ken Saro Wiwa, struggle for political power, resource curse and agitation for resource 
control. 
 
Quoting Akanna (2007) “The situation caused many indigenes to feel frustrated that another hope and promise 
had gone down the drain. It marked the beginning of hydra-headed issue of kidnapping of oil workers. The 
people, particularly the youth, in their own judgment, now felt that the best way to react was by disturbing the 
flow of oil. They were of the view that since Abuja would not fulfill its pledges, they too would cripple the source 
through which oil money flow to the seat of power.” 
 
Gilbert (2010) opined that as a result of the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa the Niger Delta people felt that nonviolent 
tactics had failed catastrophically to persuade the state and the multinational oil companies to proactively settle 
salient issues of environmental despoliation, degradation, neglect, politics of exclusion and other forms of 
injustices imposed on them since the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities at Oloibiri in 1956.  
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Consequently, after the death of Sani Abacha in 1998 and the subsequent democratization process, youths in the 
Niger Delta resorted to the formation of armed militant groups for the purpose of advancing the cause of the Niger 
Delta.  
 
Ojakorutu (2010) was of the opinion that environmental activism and militancy are a direct response to the 
impunity, human rights violations, and perceived neglect of the region by the Nigerian state on one hand and 
sustained environmental hazards imposed on local Niger Delta communities as a result of production activities of 
multinational oil companies on the other. According to him the social movements in the Niger Delta emerged as a 
result of environmental degradation and political insensitivity of the Nigerian state. The frustration arising from 
the forceful attitude of the Federal Government and oil companies to bring them to submission underlines their 
quest for self- determination and autonomy. All they were interested in originally was to be part of the Nigerian 
state where their rights of existence including opportunities would be guaranteed. The government’s perception of 
these struggles generated a hot controversy, appropriately to the militant issues at stake. 
 
Various authors including Ibaba (2005) identified other factors that have lead to militant activities in the Niger 
Delta as federalism and the politics of revenue sharing in Nigeria, environmental injustices and human rights 
violation, failure of corporate social responsibility on the part of multinational oil companies, accountability and 
transparency failures in governance, hegemonic politics and the obnoxious laws that govern the oil industry. The 
conclusion from the above authors was that it is the prevailing reality in the Niger Delta that has given birth to an 
environment of perpetual agitations, youths’ restiveness, insurgency and general insecurity. 
 
Chronology of Militant Activities in the Niger Delta 2006 to 2008  
 
 
Table 1: Chronology of Militant Activities in the Niger Delta 
 
Year/Month Kidnapping Bombings Assassinations Others 
2006 January 4 1 - Threaten wave of new attacks 
February 9 3 - - 
March - 1 - - 
May 3 - 1 - 
June 15 - 6 - 
July 25 - - Seize of Agip Ogbainbiri flow station 
August 21  1 Nigerian Army launch crackdown on 
militants. Soldiers fire from the air. 
October 32 - - - 
November 9 - 1 - 
December 9 2 3 - 
2007 January 50 1 3 Seize of German Shipping line Baco-Liner 
cargo ship 
February 8 - - Release of those kidnapped in January 
March 3 - 1 Release of some hostages 
April 4 - 2 Release of some hostages 
May 45 3 - More hostages are released 
June 27 - 12 More hostages are released. Troops kill 12 
Militants in a dawn raid 
July 6 - - Release of some hostages 
August 1 - - Release of one hostage.  Militants make a 
demand or else they restart attacks. 
September 2 - 1 - 
October 13 - - - 
2008 March 1 - - - 
May 2 - - - 
June 1 - 20 M.E.N.D. declares ceasefire from attacks, Rival 
militants in gunfire. Militants call of cease fire 
July 2 - - Nigerians flee Niger Delta after Militants 
threaten to behead people 
 
Source: Authors’ Compilations 2013 
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Militant activities in the Niger Delta can be traced back to 1966 when Isaac Adaka Boro formed the Delta 
Volunteer Force (DVSF) to confront the Nigerian state till present time. Since then, militants in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria had been involved in various and diverse activities. Gunmen have abducted over 200 foreigners in the 
Niger Delta in the course of the various attacks. Most were released in exchange for money. A chronicle of such 
activities, teased together, from various sources are contained in Table 1. 
 
Materials and Methods 
The records in the Rivers State Branch of  the Nigerian Institution of Estate Surveyors and Valuers showed that 
there are 99 firms of Estate Surveyors and Valuers in Port Harcourt, and this constitute the population for this 
study. The Branch records was adopted instead of the directory dated 2009 which showed that there are only 39 
Estate Surveying and Valuation firms in the study area. Descriptive and inferential statistical tools such as 
frequency and percentages, relative importance index (RII) and factor analysis are used. Relative importance 
index was used to get a measure and a reasonably reliable actual position of the respondent(s) on the attitude 
continuum. Under Relative Importance Index measure, variables are rated using a 5 point Likert scale, so as to 
assist in assessing the significance of each factor. The Relative Importance Index (RII) was evaluated using the 
following expression: 
 
RII= ∑aini 
           ∑xj 
 
where:i= response category index 
xj= the sum of j factors 1,2,3,………N 
ai= constant expressing the weight given to the ith response 
nj=the variable expressing the frequency of the ith 
 
On the other hand, factor analysis was used to remove redundant (highly correlated) variables from the data file so 
as to replace the entire data file with a smaller number of uncorrelated variables. This was done so as to select 
small group of variables from larger set to put objects (people) into categories depending on their factor scores. 
The different methods of extracting the factors from a set of data include principal component analysis (PCA), 
principal factors analysis (PFA), image factoring analysis (IFA), maximum likelihood factoring, alpha factoring, 
unweighted least squares and generalized least squares (Ajibola 2012). Principal component analysis is the most 
commonly used and that was adopted for this study. It was used to reduce the factors identified to the most 
important ones by determining the correlation that exists between them. 
 
Results and Discussions 
 
In this section, the data collected were collated, analysed and the results are as presented in Tables 2 – 12 
followed by the discussions. 
 
Table 2: Professional Qualifications 
 
Category Frequency Percentage 
 Fellow 10 16.2 
Associate 46 67.6 
Probationer 12 16.2 
Total 68 100.0 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
Table 2 contains the professional qualifications of the respondents and it reveals that 16.2% are fellows of the 
Nigrian Institution of Estate Surveyors and Valuers while 67.6% are Associate members and the remaining 16.2% 
are probationers. This implies that 83.8% of the respondents (Fellows and Associates) are professionally qualified 
to practice as Estate Surveyors and Valuers whose professional judgment can be relied upon. 
 
Table 3 contains the years of experience of the respondent Estate Surveyors and Valuers. The table shows that 
19.1% have worked for less than 5 years, 51.5% have worked for between 5and 10 years, while 29.4% have 
worked for between 10 years and above. With about 80.9% of the respondents having more than 5 years working 
experience implies that the respondents are experienced, competent and knowledgeable enough to supply reliable, 
adequate and up to date data needed for this study. 
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Table 3: Years of Experience 
 
Experience Frequency Percentage 
Less than 5 years 13 19.1 
5-10 years 35 51.5 
10 years and above 20 29.4 
Total 68 100.0 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
Table 4: Do you Let or Sell Properties in Areas Affected by Militant Activities? 
 
Opinion Frequency Percent 
Yes 57       83.8 
No 11 16.2 
Total 68 100.0 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
Table 4 shows that 83.8% of the respondents (Estate Surveyors and Valuers) have let or sold properties in those 
areas of Port Harcourt City affected by militant activities while the remaining 16.2% do not have properties in the 
areas affected by Militant Activities.  
 
Table 5: Was it Difficult to get Properties disposed in Areas Affected By Militant Activities? 
 
Opinion Frequency Percent 
Yes 57 83.8 
No 11 16.2 
Total 68 100.0 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
Table 5 reveals that 83.8% of the respondents admitted to have faced difficulties in getting properties disposed in 
the areas affected by militant activities, while the remaining 16.2% did not experience any challenge. This 
however shows that militant activities has made it difficult for properties to be disposed either by sale or letting. 
Comparing table 4 with table 5, it could mean that respondents who have no properties to let or for sale in areas 
affected by militant activities are the ones who had no challenge in getting thier properties disposed off.  
 
Table 6: Rental Values in Areas affected by Militant Activites and Areas not affected by Militant Activites 
 
Rental Values in Areas not Affected by Militant Activities 
Years 
4bedroom 
detached house 
3bedroo
mflat 
2bedroom 
flat 
5bedroom 
detached house 
4bedroom 
terraced house 
Self contained 
units 
2005 900000 400000 200000 1200000 1000000 60000 
2006 950000 400000 250000 1200000 1100000 60000 
2007 1000000 450000 250000 1400000 1000000 70000 
2008 1200000 500000 300000 1500000 1200000 70000 
2009 1300000 500000 300000 1500000 1400000 80000 
2010 1400000 600000 320000 2000000 1600000 100000 
2011 1700000 650000 350000 2500000 1800000 120000 
2012 2500000 700000 400000 3000000 2000000 150000 
Rental Values in Areas Affected by Militant Activities 
Years 4bedroom 
Detached house 
3bedroom 
flat 
2bedroom 
flat 
5bedroom 
detached house 
4bedroom 
terraced house 
Self contained 
units 
2005 1000000 400000 200000 1200000 900000 60000 
2006 900000 350000 150000 1000000 850000 60000 
2007 900000 300000 150000 800000 800000 70000 
2008 800000 300000 150000 1000000 800000 70000 
2009 800000 300000 150000 1000000 800000 80000 
2010 1200000 500000 200000 1500000 900000 100000 
2011 1500000 500000 250000 1800000 1000000 120000 
2012 1800000 600000 300000 2000000 1200000 130000 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
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The Table 6 shows the different types of properties in the areas affected by militant activities and area not affected 
activities. The table reveals that prior to disturbance by militant activities (2005), rental values in the tow 
neighbourhoods were the same. During the period of disturbance (2006 – 2009), a remarkable difference was 
manifested in the rental values from the two neighbourhoods. However, after the disturbance, rental values began 
to pick up in the areas affected by militant activities but not as high as those of the areas not affected by the 
disturbance. It can therefore be concluded that militant activities affected property values in the study area. 
 
Figs 1 and 2 give graphical demonstration of trends in rental values in areas affected by militant activities and 
areas not affected by militant activities. 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Rental Analysis in Areas Affected by Militant Activities 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
Fig 1 shows the trends in rental values in areas affected by militant activities. From the graph it is obvious that the 
effects on rental values varies amongst the various housing types in the study area.  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
4bedroom detached house 1000000 900000 900000 800000 800000 1200000 1500000 1800000
3bedroomflat 400000 350000 300000 300000 300000 500000 500000 600000
2bedroomflat 200000 150000 150000 150000 150000 200000 250000 300000
5bedroom detached house 1200000 1000000 800000 1000000 1000000 1500000 1800000 2000000
4bedroom teracced house 900000 850000 800000 800000 800000 900000 1000000 1200000
self contained units 60000 60000 70000 70000 80000 100000 120000 130000
R² = 0.578
R² = 0.488
R² = 0.488
R² = 0.622
R² = 0.446
R² = 0.908
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
P
R
IC
E
RENTAL ANALYSIS OF AREAS AFFECTED BY MILITANT ACTIVITIES
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From the table it can be seen that before the violent activities of militant groups became rampant (2005) the rental 
values were higher than during the period when the violent activities of militant groups started (2006 – 2009), and 
after the activities subsided around 2010 the rental values began to increa again and started to stabilize. This 
shows that the drop in rental values and subsequent increase can be attributed to the militant activites in that area.  
 
 
 
Fig 2: Rental Analysis in Areas not Affected by Militant Activities 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
Fig 2 shows the rental values in areas not affected by militant activities between the period of 2005 and 2012. The 
graph reveals that rental values continued to rise from during the period under examination. This shows that 
properties in this area were not affected by militant activities. 
 
Table 7: R2 of the Various Regression lines in Areas Affected and Not Affected by Militant Activities. 
 
PROPERTY TYPE AREAS AFFECTED BY 
MILITANT ACTIVITIES (R2) 
AREAS NOT AFFECTED BY 
MILITANT ACTIVITIES(R2) 
5 Bedroom detached house 0.6226 0.8585 
4 Bedroom detached house 0.5784 0.8041 
4 Bedroom terraced house 0.4468 0.9219 
3 Bedroom flat 0.4883 0.9550 
2 Bedroom flat 0.4889 0.9537 
Self contained unit 0.9089 0.8665 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
Table 7 contains a comparison of regression lines (R2) of rental values in both neighbourhoods.  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
4bedroom detached house 900000 950000 1000000 1200000 1300000 1400000 1700000 2500000
3bedroomflat 400000 400000 450000 500000 500000 600000 650000 700000
2bedroomflat 200000 250000 250000 300000 300000 320000 350000 400000
5bedroom detached house 1200000 1200000 1400000 1500000 1500000 2000000 2500000 3000000
4bedroom teracced house 1000000 1100000 1000000 1200000 1400000 1600000 1800000 2000000
self contained units 60000 60000 70000 70000 80000 100000 120000 150000
R² = 0.804
R² = 0.955
R² = 0.953
R² = 0.858
R² = 0.922
R² = 0.866
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
p
ri
c
e
RENTAL ANALYSIS OF AREAS NOT AFFECTED BY MILITANT ACTIVITIES
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The table shows that properties in areas not affected by militant activites have higher R2 as against those of the 
areas affected by militant activities. All the properties except the self contained units have greater R2 than 
properties in areas affected by militant activites. This shows that the rental values of self contained units in the 
study area are not affected by militant activites while all other property types are affected by militant activities. It 
can therefore be concluded that militant activities affected property values in study area. 
 
Table 8: Causes of Militant Activities in Port Harcourt City 
 
Factors Yes No 
Hostility in the Niger Delta 54 (79.4%) 14 (20.6%) 
Underdevelopment and Unemployment 65 (95.6%) 3   (4.4%) 
Environmental Damage due to Oil Spillage 41 (60.3%) 27 (39.7%) 
Human Rights Violation 54 (79.4%) 14 (20.6%) 
Bad Governance/ Corruption 55 (80.9%) 13 (19.1%) 
Religious Matters 1   (1.5%) 67 (98.5%) 
Racism 2   (2.9%) 66 (97.1%) 
Ethno Social Crisis 8   (11.8%) 60 (88.2%) 
Struggle for Political Power 51 (75.0%) 17 (25.0%) 
Agitation For Resource control 55 (80.9%) 13 (19.1%) 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
The factors responsible for militant activities in Port Harcourt city are contained in table 8. Underdevelopment 
and unemployment (95.6%) is the major cause of militant activities in the study area. This was followed by bad 
governance/corruption and agitation for resource control (80.9% respectively). Other factors include hostility in 
the Niger Delta and human rights violation (79.4%respectively), struggle for political power (75.0%), 
environmental damage due to oil spillage (60.3 %), ethno social crisis (11.8%), racism (2.9%) and religious 
matters (1.5%). From this it can be said that underdevelopment and unemployment, agitation for resource control, 
bad governance/corruption, hostility in the Niger Delta, human rights violation and struggle for political power 
are the major causes of militant activities in Port Harcourt. 
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Table 9: Ranking of Causes of Militant Activities in Port Harcourt 
 
Factors Very Important 
5 
Importan
t 
 
4 
Undecided 
 
3 
Not Very 
Important 
2 
Not 
Important 
1 
Total RII Rank 
Hostility in the 
Niger Delta 
33 aini = 
165 
21 aini = 
84 
5 aini = 
15 
7 aini = 
14 
2 aini = 
2 
68 
280 
4.118 4th 
Underdevelopmen
t and 
Unemployment 
45 aini = 
225 
18 aini = 
72 
1 aini = 
3 
4 aini = 
8 
0 aini = 
0 
68 
308 
4.529 1st 
Environmental 
Damage due to Oil 
Spillage 
10 aini = 
50 
25 aini = 
100 
7 aini = 
21 
13 aini = 
26 
13 aini = 
13 
68 
210 
3.088 7th 
Human Rights 
Violation 
29 aini = 
145 
24 aini = 
96 
2 aini = 
6 
11 aini = 
22 
2 aini = 
2 
68 
271 
3.985 5th 
Bad Governance/ 
Corruption 
38 aini = 
190 
17 aini = 
68 
4 aini = 
12 
9 aini = 
18 
0 aini = 
0 
68 
288 
4.235 3rd 
Religious Matters 0 aini = 0 
0 aini = 
0 
43 aini = 
129 
1 aini = 
2 
24 aini = 
24 
68 
155 
2.279 8th 
Racism 0 aini = 0 
0 aini = 
0 
13 aini = 
39 
2 aini = 
4 
53 aini = 
53 
68 
96 
1.412 9th 
Ethno Social 
Crisis 
0 aini = 
0 
0 aini = 
0 
4 aini = 
12 
7 aini = 
14 
57 aini = 
57 
68 
83 
1.221 10th 
Struggle for 
Political Power 
31 aini = 
155 
20 aini = 
80 
2 aini = 
6 
9 aini = 
18 
6 aini = 
6 
68 
265 
3.897 6th 
Agitation For 
Resource control 
52 aini = 
260 
5 aini = 
20 
7 aini = 
21 
1 aini = 
2 
3 aini = 
3 
68 
306 
4.5 2nd 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
Table 9 shows the respondents’ ranking of the causes of militant activities in Port Harcourt city. The table reveals 
that underdevelopment and unemployment was ranked as number one with an RII of 4.529, agitation for resource 
control with an RII of 4.5 was ranked as number two cause. Other causes ranked in order of effect are bad 
governance/corruption (RII=4.235), hostility in the Niger Delta (RII=4.118), human rights violation (RII=3.985), 
struggle for political power (RII=3.897), environmental damage due to oil spillage (RII=3.088), religious matters 
(RII=2.279), racism (RII=1.412) and ethno social crisis (RII=1.221). Comparing tables 8 and 9 it is obvious that 
underdevelopment and unemployment, agitation for resource control, bad governance/corruption, hostility in the 
Niger Delta, human rights violation, struggle for political power are the main causes of militant activities in the 
study area. 
 
Table 10: Communalities 
 
Components Initial Extraction 
Hostility in the Niger delta 1.000 .765 
Underdevelopment and unemployment 1.000 .812 
Environmental damage due to oil spillage 1.000 .627 
Human rights violation 1.000 .665 
Bad governance/corruption 1.000 .672 
Religious matters 1.000 .748 
Racism 1.000 .827 
Ethno social crisis 1.000 .720 
Struggle for political power 1.000 .361 
Agitation for resource control 1.000 .584 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
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Table 10 shows the amount of variance in each variable. Initial communalities are estimates of the variance in 
each variable accounted for by all components or factors. Extraction communalities are estimates of the variance 
which each variable accounts for. The communalities in Table 10 are high, indicating that the extracted 
components represent the variable well.  
 
Table 11: Total Variance Explained 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % Of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.340 23.404 23.404 2.340 23.404 23.404 
2 2.054 20.540 43.944 2.054 20.540 43.944 
3 1.325 13.252 57.196 1.325 13.252 57.196 
4 1.062 10.615 67.811 1.062 10.615 67.811 
5 .968 9.677 77.488    
6 .664 6.638 84.126    
7 .530 5.300 89.426    
8 .457 4.573 93.999    
9 .408 4.075 98.074    
10 .193 1.926 100.000    
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
 
 
Table 11 shows the variance explained by the initial eigenvalues (Initial solution). Under the Initial Eigenvalues 
the total column gives the amount of variance in the original variables accounted for by each component, the 
percent of variance column gives the ratio of the variance accounted for by each component of the total variance 
in all of the variables. The eigenvalues greater than one was extracted and this show that the first four principal 
components (hostility in the Niger Delta, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental damage due to oil 
spillage and human rights violation) form the extracted solution accounting for 67.8% of the total variability in all 
the 10 factors so that the complexity of all the factors can be reduced using the extracted variables 
 
Table 12: Component Matrix 
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
Hostility in the Niger delta .091 -.135 .859 -.027 
Underdevelopment and 
unemployment 
-.039 -.349 .055 .828 
Environmental damage due to oil 
spillage 
.002 .683 .213 .340 
Human rights violation -.463 .592 -.123 .293 
Bad governance/corruption -.538 .268 .555 -.045 
Religious matters .832 .135 .097 .166 
Racism .845 .265 .013 .205 
Ethno social crisis .485 .638 -.129 -.248 
Struggle for political power .003 .491 .302 -.172 
Agitation for resource control -.430 .538 -.313 .106 
 
Source: Author’s Fieldwork, 2013. 
 
Table 12 shows the rotated component matrix of the four components that accounted for 67.8% of the total 
variability in the original 10 variables. The first component (hostility in the Niger Delta) is most highly correlated 
with racism (0.845) meaning that the hostility in the Niger Delta is responsible for racism in Port Harcourt, 
however it is less correlated with bad governance and corruption (-0.538). The second component 
(underdevelopment and unemployment) is most highly correlated with environmental damage due to oil spillage 
(0.683).  The third component (environmental damage due to oil spillage) is most highly correlated with hostility 
in the Niger Delta (0.859) showing that it best explains the hostility in the Niger Delta and the fourth component 
(human rights violation) is most highly correlated with underdevelopment and unemployment (0.828). This 
further confirms that the first four factors earlier identified are the major causes of militant activities the study 
area. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The study examined the causes of militant activities and their effects on property values in Port Harcourt. It was 
discovered that militant activities within the study area affected the marketability of properties in the areas; this 
was evident in the difficulties which Estate Surveyors and Valuers faced in getting properties in areas affected by 
the activities disposed off by sale and/or letting. Also a fall in rental values of properties was discovered from the 
period when the activities started and an increase after the violent activities stopped. This goes to show that the 
militant activities in Port Harcourt affected property value.  
 
The study also showed that there is a variance in rental values over the period of time studied between the areas 
affected by militant activities and the areas not affected by militant activities, with the areas not affected having 
higher rental values than the areas exposed to militant activities. The analysis carried out shows that the major 
causes of militant activities in Port Harcourt, Rivers State are underdevelopment and unemployment. The study 
therefore recommends that concerted efforts are required on the part of both the government and oil companies in 
mitigating the various factors leading to militant activities in Port Harcourt. Doing this, will attract interest of 
residents to the city thereby resulting into increased demand for properties and attendant increase in rental values.  
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